Introduction

U
In many procurement situations, the buyer cares about attributes other than price when evaluating the offers submitted by suppliers. Examples of nonmonetary attributes that buyers care about include lead time, time to completion, and quality. Buyers have adopted several practices for dealing with these situations. Some use detailed request-for-quotes that specify minimum standards that the offers need to satisfy, and then evaluate the submitted bids based on price only. Others select a small set of potential suppliers and negotiate on all dimensions of the contract with each of them.
A third option is to combine the competition induced by a request-for-quote with the flexibility in terms of contract specification offered by negotiation. Several procedures belong to this category. In a "menu auction," the buyer lets suppliers submit menus of price and nonmonetary attributes, and choose the combination that best suits his needs. In a "beauty contest," the buyer tells suppliers he cares about other attributes than price but requests a single offer from them. Again, he chooses the offer he prefers from the received offers. In a scoring auction, the buyer The rest of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model and introduces the notion of pseudotype. Section 3 proves that the pseudotypes are sufficient statistics in our environment, and establishes the correspondence between scoring auctions and regular IPV auctions. Our expected utility equivalence theorem is proved in Section 4. Section 5 compares the outcome of scoring auctions with that of menu auctions, beauty contests, and auctions with minimum quality standards. Section 6 concludes.
Model
N Environment. We consider a buyer seeking to procure an indivisible good for which there are N potential suppliers. The good is characterized by its price, p, and M > 1 nonmonetary attributes, Q E Rm.
Preferences.
The buyer values the good (p, Q) at v(Q, t) -p, where t E [t, 7] indexes the buyer's taste for quality.
6 Supplier i's profit from selling good (p, Q) is given by p -c(Q, Oi), where Oi E R', K > 1, is supplier i's type. We allow suppliers to be flexible with respect to the level of nonmonetary attributes they can supply. 7 We assume that v and c are twice continuously differentiable with VQ, CQ > 0, v -c bounded, and VQQ -CQQ negative definite. In particular, this allows for costs that are independent across attributes and convex in individual attributes. We partially order the type space by assuming that co, > 0. When we analyze the first price menu auction, we will also impose VQt> 0 and VQQ, negative semidefinite.
Because social welfare is bounded and strictly concave in Q, the first-best level of nonmonetary attributes for each supplier, QFB(oi) = arg max{v(Q, t) -c(Q, 0i)}, is well defined and unique.
Information. Preferences are common knowledge among suppliers and the buyer, with the exception of suppliers' types, 6i, i = 1,... N, and the buyer's taste parameter, t, which are privately observed. Types are independently distributed according to the continuous joint density functionf&(.) with support on a bounded and convex subset of RK with a nonempty interior, Oi. Taste is distributed according to the continuous density h(.). These density functions are common knowledge.
El Allocation mechanism. We now introduce the scoring auction. We start with two definitions:
A scoring rule is a function S: •RM+I ->. R : (p, Q) --* S(p, Q) that associates a score to any potential contract and represents a continuous preference relation over contract characteristics (p, Q) . A scoring rule is quasilinear if it can be expressed as O(Q) -p or any monotonic increasing function thereof We assume that the scoring rule is twice continuously differentiable and strictly increasing in Q, and that the resulting "apparent social welfare," O(Q) -c(Q, 0), is bounded and strictly concave in Q for all 0. For simplicity, we let maxQ{fO(Q) -c(Q, 0)} > 0 for all 0 to ensure that all suppliers participate in the auction at equilibrium.
A scoring auction is an allocation mechanism where suppliers submit bids of the type (p, Q) E RM'+ Bids are evaluated according to a scoring rule. The winner is the bidder with the highest score. The outcome of the scoring auction is a probability of winning the contract, xi, a score to fulfill when the supplier wins the contract, tW, and a payment to the buyer in case he does not, ti. A scoring auction is quasilinear when it uses a quasilinear scoring rule.
For example, in a first-score scoring auction, the winner must deliver a contract that generates the value of his winning score, that is, tiw = S(pi, Qi), tL = 0. In an ascending scoring auction, the buyer progressively raises the required score to fulfill by any standing offer until all suppliers 6 Until Section 5, in which we consider alternative mechanisms to the scoring auction, nothing is lost if t is assumed to be common knowledge. We introduce the notation here for completeness. 7 Rezende (2004) studies a procurement model with fixed levels of nonmonetary attributes. In our model, the level of nonmonetary attributes is determined during the auction process.
but one drop out. t,' is the value of that score and ti = 0. In a second-score scoring auction, the winner must deliver a contract that generates a score equal to the score of the second-best offer received. Note that when the scoring rule does not correspond to the buyer's preference-something which might be in his interest (Che, 1993; Asker and Cantillon, 2006 )--commitment is essential. In public procurement, this might be easily done. The process must often abide by a strict set of rules and procedures, so that, in effect, the call for tender (and thus the scoring rule) is legally binding for the buyer. In private procurement, this might be harder, although, in principle, the buyer could sign a contract with the bidders before bidding takes place in which he commits to use the scoring rule. Such a contract could be enforced through an independent third-party audit. Repetition is an alternative mechanism.
We now proceed to the analysis of bidding behavior in the scoring auction. Consider supplier i with type 6i who has won the contract with a score to fulfill tw. Supplier i will choose characteristics (p, Q) that maximize his profit, that is, max{p -c(Q, 0/)} subject to O/(Q) -p = t,.
(p,Q)
Substituting forp into the objective function yields
An important feature of (1) is that the optimal Q is independent of tiW. Define
Q
We shall call k(Oi) supplier i's pseudotype. It is the maximum level of apparent social surplus that supplier i can generate. Bidders' pseudotypes are well defined as soon as the scoring rule is given. The set of supplier i's possible pseudotypes is an interval in R. The density of pseudotypes inherits the smooth properties of f,. With this definition, supplier i's expected profit is given by
In (2), supplier i's preference over contracts of the type (x,, t1w, ti') is entirely captured by his pseudotype. Only quasilinear scoring rules have this property when private information is multidimensional. Indeed, consider a more general scoring rule S(p, Q). Assume that S is twice continuously differentiable, strictly increasing in Q and strictly decreasing in p. Bidder i's optimization problem becomes
Let qJ(Q, tiW) be the price required to generate a score of ti' with nonmonetary attributes Q (T' is well defined because S is strictly decreasing in p and strictly increasing in Q; it is strictly increasing in Q and strictly decreasing in t,w). The objective function of bidder i becomes max IP(Q, tiW) -c(Q, Oi)}, and his expected payoff from contract (xi, t1w, ti) is given by u(x,, tiw, tL; Oi) = x, max 14, (Q, t,w) -c(Q, 0)} -(I -x)tif.
Suppose we can organize types in equivalence classes such that all types in a given class share the same preferences over contracts. Concretely, suppose that types 9, and i :A O, belong to such a class. It must be that u(xi, tiw, tiL; 0) = u(xi, iw, ti;Oi) ifand only ifu ( xi,0,; i 
0qJ(Q(Oi, tiw), t W). This equality will in general not be satisfied for 0i 0g 9 unless %P is separable in Q and tiW. In turn, this requires that the scoring rule be quasilinear (%J (Q, tw) = O(Q) -tiw for a quasilinear scoring rule).' Finally, we carry out one last simplification of the problem. Let si = xit' + (1 -xi)tf in (2). Given suppliers' risk neutrality and the linearity of the scoring rule, there is no loss in defining the outcome of a scoring auction as the pair (xi, si), rather than (xi, tw, tf). Suppliers' expected payoff is thus given by
Notation. For the remainder, we adopt the following notation and conventions. The outcome function of a scoring auction is a vector of probabilities of winning (x 1 ,. .. , x N) and scores to fulfill by each supplier, (s 1,.., SN).
(If the outcome in a given scoring auction is stochastic, these are distributions over vectors of probabilities of winning and scores.) The arguments in these functions are the bids submitted by all suppliers, {(pi, Qi)lN 9 Later in the article, we will switch to a direct revelation mechanism approach where the outcome will be a function of suppliers' pseudotypes, (kl .... kN) R RN. To avoid introducing too much new notation, we shall make these the arguments of the x and s functions. We shall also write xi(ki) to denote the expectation of xi over the types of the other suppliers, Ek-,xi(ki, k-i). The arguments will be spelled out whenever confusion is possible.
A sufficient statistics result
0 Suppliers' pseudotypes are sufficient statistics in this environment if knowing the distribution of suppliers' pseudotypes is all one needs in order to describe the set of equilibrium outcomes of the auction and evaluate the buyer's expected payoff.
In this section, we prove that pseudotypes are sufficient statistics. Proving this result requires two steps. First, we show that all equilibria of the scoring auction are outcome equivalent to an equilibrium where suppliers are forced to submit bids only as a function of their pseudotypes. We define two equilibria as outcome equivalent if they both lead to the same distribution of outcomes (x, .... ,x N) and (S 1. S s N) in the aggregate. Because outcome equivalence is not enough to guarantee that the buyer is indifferent among these equilibria, we next prove the stronger result that the equilibria in the scoring auction and in the constrained scoring auction have the same distribution of outcomes, conditional on types. Lemma 1. All equilibria of a quasilinear scoring auction are outcome equivalent to an equilibrium where bidders with the same pseudotypes adopt the same strategies.
Proof. Consider any equilibrium (E9 . . N), where Si is a mapping from 0, to a distribution over (p, Q) E IRM'+. Then, for all i, for all 0 and all (p*, Q*) in the support of supplier i's equilibrium strategy,
p,Q where the expression for supplier i's expected profit derives from (5). In (6), suppliers' private information enters their objective function only through their pseudotypes. Thus, supplier i is indifferent among the strategies played by all the realizations of supplier i's type with the same pseudotype.
' The requirement of quasilinearity of the scoring rule is only needed when private information is multidimensional. When private information is one-dimensional there is a one-to-one mapping between types and pseudotypes. The equivalence classes of types with the same preferences are thus singletons.
9 Or, more generally, in the case of open formats, the strategies of the bidders.
We can construct a new equilibrium, (8,, ..... N), such that:
2. Define Oj(k) = {fO E 08 I k(0j) = k}. For each k in the support of bidder i's pseudotypes, the distribution over (p, Q) generated under E, for a given 0, E Bi(k) replicates the aggregate distribution over (p, Q) over all 0, E 8i(k) under E,.
By construction, the distribution of bidder i's opponents' strategies is the same as before from bidder i's perspective. Moreover, E is a best response for bidder i. Hence it is an ejuilibrium, and bidders' strategies are only a function of their pseudotypes. By construction, (el .... EN) and ($Sh .... SN) lead to the same aggregate distribution of (p, Q) and therefore scores and probabilities of winning. Q.E.D.
An aspect of Lemma 1 worth stressing is the role played by the assumption that types are independent across bidders. From the expression of suppliers' expected profit, xjk(0) -si, we already know that their payoffs are only a function of their pseudotypes. Independence ensures that their beliefs are also independent of their types beyond their pseudotypes (actually, independence is stronger: it makes suppliers' beliefs independent of their types and pseudotypes). Without independence, bidders' private information would enter their expected payoff in (6), both through their pseudotypes and through their expectations over their opponents' types.
Lemma 1 implies that the set of possible outcomes (x ,..., X N) and (s ,..., SN) can be generated by equilibria where suppliers bid exclusively on the basis of their pseudotypes. However, it does not imply that nothing is lost by restricting attention to these equilibria. Outcome equivalence does not imply utility equivalence for the buyer. To see this, consider the following example.
Consider two e_ually likely types, Oi and 0, (this assumption is inessential for the argument) such that k(0i) = k(0i) and suppose that, in equilibrium, they get a different outcome: (xi, s,) and (x',, •) . By definition, these two types generate expected utility fj(0j)sj + fj(C0)-for the buyer, according to the scoring rule. However, this differs from true expected utility if 0'(.) :A v(., t). To know how much expected utility the suppliers generate for the buyer, we need to know how they will satisfy their obligations. Let Q and Q be the choice of 0, and 0j, respectively (these are independent of si andS/). The total monetary transfer from the buyer to the suppliers is then given by xjO(Q) -si and 5, j(Q) -•, and the buyer's true expected utility is given by
This equilibrium is outcome equivalent to an equilibrium where type 0, adopts 0i's strategy and vice versa. In that equilibrium, the buyer's true expected utility is given by
Clearly, the buyer is not indifferent between these two equilibria unless xi = 3, or v(Q, t) = O(Q). The next result ensures that suppliers with the same pseudotypes receive the same equilibrium outcome function (xi, si) . This rules out the situation described in the previous example.
Consider any equilibrium (9 ..... SN). Define
(p*., Q* ))]. Let 1 (k), 37i(k) be the resulting scores to fulfill. In words, xi(k) is the lowest expected probability of winning the contract among all the bids in the support of bidder i's strategy when he has pseudotype k. Similarly, Y-(k) is his highest expected probability of winning. Proof. Define Ui(k) as supplier i's equilibrium expected payoff when he has pseudotype k.
Hence xi (k) is monotonically increasing in k. The same argument applies to Y, (k). Hence x (k) and Ti(k) are almost everywhere continuous. A similar argument based on the IC constraint establishes that 1 (k) > Yi(k) for all k < k. Together with the a.e. continuity of these functions, this implies that x_(k) = Yi(k) (and sJk) = 3T(k)) almost everywhere. Q.E.D.
Define two equilibria as typewise outcome equivalent if they generate the same distribution of outcomes (x 1 ,.. ., x N) and (s 1,. .... , s N), conditional on types in G) I X ... x ON-We are now able to prove the main result of this section.
Theorem 1. Every equilibrium in the scoring auction is typewise outcome equivalent to an equilibrium in the scoring auction where suppliers are constrained to bid only on the basis of their pseudotypes, and vice versa.
Proof. All equilibria in the constrained auction are also equilibria in the scoring auction because bidders' preferences and beliefs are entirely determined by their pseudotypes. Lemma 2 implies that all types with the same pseudotype get the same x and s a.e. in all equilibria. Q.E.D.
Theorem 1 ensures that there is no loss of generality in concentrating on pseudotypes when deriving the equilibrium in the scoring auction, even if the scoring rule does not correspond to the buyer's true preference. (Note that Theorem 1 does not rule out equilibria where different types submit different (p, Q) bids-but given that they yield the same score and the same probability of winning at equilibrium, they are payoff irrelevant.)
Most theoretical analyses of scoring auctions have implicitly or explicitly taken advantage of pseudotypes to derive an equilibrium in these auctions (Che, 1993; Bushnell and Oren, 1994, 1995) . Theorem 1 suggests that doing so does not discard any other equilibria of interest. Although this might not be totally surprising when types are one-dimensional, this result is not trivial for environments where types are multidimensional. This property is a consequence of the combination of the quasilinear scoring rule, the single dimensionality of the allocation decision, and the independence of types across bidders. We cannot reduce the strategic environment to onedimensional private information if any of these conditions does not hold. As argued in Section 1, the quasilinearity of the scoring rule is necessary to be able to summarize suppliers' preferences over contracts by a single number. As noted after Lemma 1, independence was needed to make suppliers' beliefs independent of their types. Neither condition is necessary to use pseudotypes to derive an equilibrium in the one-dimensional model (for example, Branco, 1997 extends Che's model to correlated private information).
The next result makes the relationship between scoring auctions and standard one-object auctions even more explicit.
Corollary 1. The equilibrium in quasilinear scoring auctions with independent types inherits the properties of the equilibrium in the related single-object auction where (i) bidders are risk neutral, (ii) their (private) valuations for the object correspond to the pseudotype k in the original scoring auction and are distributed accordingly, (iii) the highest bidder wins, and (iv) the payment rule is determined as in the scoring auction, with bidders' scores being replaced by bidders' bids.
Corollary 1 has practical implications for the derivation of the equilibrium in scoring auctions. It suggests the following simple algorithm for deriving equilibria in scoring auctions: (1) given the scoring rule, derive the distribution of pseudotypes, Gi(k), (2) solve for the equilibrium in the related IPV auction where valuations are distributed according to Gi(k), b,(k) , and (3) the "0 Note that when x,_(k) < .i(k), different types with the same pseudotype use different equilibrium strategies or they use the same mixed strategy.
" Without loss of generality, we focus on equilibria that involve optimal strategies for all realizations of types. equilibrium bid in the scoring auction is any (p, Q) such that S(p, Q) = bi(k). (The actual (p, Q) delivered are easy to derive given bi(k) and the solution to equation (1).) 4. Expected utility equivalence across auction formats 0 In this section, we extend the revenue equivalence theorem (Myerson, 1981; Riley and Samuelson, 1981) to multi-attribute environments. Che (1993) proved the utility equivalence between the first-and second-score scoring auction when types are one-dimensional and the scoring rule corresponds to the buyer's true preference. Theorem 2 shows that this result extends to multidimensional private information and scoring rules that do not correspond to the buyer's true preference.
Theorem 2 (Expected utility equivalence). Any two scoring auctions that:
(i) use the same quasilinear scoring rule, (ii) use the same allocation rule xi(ki, k_j), i = 1,..... N, and (iii) yield the same expected payoff for the lowest pseudotype k. i = 1 . N,.
generate the same expected utility for the buyer Proof. Because the buyer's utility is quasilinear, his expected utility from a given auction is
where ESS(ki) is the expected social surplus generated by awarding the contract to bidder i with pseudotype ki. By Theorem 1, we can focus on equilibria which are only functions ofpseudotypes. Incentive compatibility implies that Ui(ki) is almost everywhere differentiable and that -LUj(kj) = xi(ki), dk, where xi(ki) is a well-defined function almost everywhere by Lemma 2. Hence, (ii) and (iii) imply that Uj(k) is the same across both auctions.
Next, fix ki and let (p* (0j, si), Q* (0, si)) be the realized contract of supplier i with type Oi E Oi(ki), when the score to satisfy is si. Because the scoring rule is quasilinear, Q* (06, si) is only a function of the scoring rule and 6,, and not of si (cf (1)). Hence,
is independent of si and equal across the two auctions given (i). The claim follows. Q.E.D.
Three points are worth noting concerning this result. First, the assumption that the scoring rule is quasilinear is key. Without it, suppliers' choice of product characteristics (p, Q) would depend on the form of the resulting obligation, that is, the auction format.
Second, the proof of Theorem 2 relies on the fact that any equilibrium is essentially pure as a function of pseudotypes (i.e., xi are functions). Without this property, expected utility equivalence between two auctions that yield the same distribution of allocations as a function of pseudotypes would only hold when the scoring rule corresponds to the true valuation (cf the argument before Lemma 2). In that case, ESS(ki) = ki and the result holds trivially.
Third, Theorem 2 implies the standard equivalence between the first-score auction, the second-score auction, and the Dutch and English auctions when bidders are symmetric. However, the symmetry requirement is with respect to the distribution of pseudotypes and not the distribution of types. In particular, some bidders can (stochastically) be stronger for one attribute and others for another attribute, yet, when it comes to pseudotypes, they can be symmetric.
Comparison with alternatives 0
In this section, we consider three alternatives to scoring auctions under three different auction formats, and for simplicity we focus on the case where suppliers are ex ante symmetric. We show that, except for the first-price menu auction, these alternatives generate equal or lower expected utility for the buyer than a scoring auction that uses the true preference of the buyer. Thus, a fortiori, a scoring auction with an optimally chosen scoring rule dominates these alternatives. We next describe these procedures in detail and discuss some of their properties. 12 In the menu auction, the buyer does not reveal his type. Instead, suppliers are asked to submit (p, Q) schedules. The buyer selects the offer that generates the highest level of utility. This alternative comes in three versions. In the "ascending" version (A), the auction takes place over several rounds. In each round, the buyer selects the supplier whose schedule generates the greatest utility. In the next round, the other suppliers are invited to submit new schedules and the process continues until no further offers are made. The winner is the supplier who offers the best schedule in the last round. The resulting contract is the (p, Q) in his schedule that the buyer prefers. In the "first-price" version (FP), the winner is the supplier offering the (p, Q) contract that generates the highest utility to the buyer and this is the resulting contract. Finally, in the "second-price" version (SP), the winner is the supplier offering the (p, Q) contract that generates the highest utility to the buyer and the resulting contract is (P, Q), where P is adjusted so that (p, Q) generates the same score as the best offer by the losers.
Menu auctions.
13
Menu auctions introduce an interesting new twist: suppliers must now account for the fact that the buyer selects the offer he prefers in the submitted menus. Let (Q(t, 0), p(t, 0)),AT denote the menu submitted by a supplier of type 0, with the indexing such that (Q(t, 0), p(t, 0)) is the offer preferred by the buyer with taste t. Incentive compatibility for the buyer requires that
v(Q(t, 0), t) -p(t, 0) > v(Q(t, 0), t) -p(t, 6)
that is, using standard arguments and the fact that vQ, >0 (vQ, ensures that Q is monotonic and thus a.e. differentiable), vQ(Q(t, 0), t)Q,(t, 0) = p,(t, 0) for all 0 and all t at which Q is differentiable.
Lemma 3. Consider any incentive-compatible menu (Q(t, 0), p(t, 0)),,T. This menu induces efficient production for all t, 0 if and only if (i) it corresponds to an ex post iso-profit curve of supplier with type 0 and (ii) Q(t, 0) is a.e. differentiable with Qt(t, 0) > 0 a.e.
Proof. Efficient production requires VQ(Q(t, 0), t) = cQ(Q(t, 0), 0) for all t, 0.
Condition (ii) follows directly from the requirement of efficiency together with the assumption that vQ,>0. Suppliers' ex post iso-profit curves are described by the locus of offers such that (t, 6) for all 0 and all t at which Q is differentiable.
Because Q,(t, 0) : 0, conditions (10) and (11) are equivalent given (9) (continuity of the efficient production level in t ensures that (10) is satisfied at nondifferentiability points of Q). Q.E.D.
Beauty contests. In a beauty contest, the buyer does not reveal his type and the suppliers are asked to submit a single bid (p, Q). It potentially comes in three forms: the ascending format, and the first-price and the second-price auctions. These formats are self-explanatory given their description for the menu auction.
"2 Bichler and Kalagnanam (2003) use the expression "auctions with configurable offers" to describe such procedures.
"13 Note that commitment will again be essential here. The buyer must be able to convince suppliers that he will not manipulate the (unannounced) scoring rule in order to increase the value of the second-best offer.
Price-only auctions. In price-only auctions, the buyer publishes a detailed request-for-quote that sets minimum levels for each attribute. All offers satisfying these conditions are evaluated on a price basis. Again, it comes in three guises: ascending, first-price and second-price. We now compare the performance of these alternative procedures with the performance of a scoring auction that uses the true preference of the buyer as its scoring rule. Let U,' (t) be the expected utility of the buyer with taste t, in format k c {A, FP, SP} and procedure l {score, menu, beauty} (where "score" stands for a scoring auction of the type described in the previous sections with the scoring rule corresponding to the true preference of the buyer).
Theorem 3. For all t, uty(t) as the bidding increment goes to zero, 0 score(tW = Um.enu(t)> Proof. See the Appendix.
For the ascending auction, we build the unique symmetric equilibrium for each procedure. The equivalence between all three procedures then stems from the direct comparison of the final allocations. For the second-price format, we show that submitting schedule 5 -{(p, Q) such that p = c(Q, 0), Q E R"gI is the unique dominant strategy equilibrium in the menu auction. The equivalence between the menu auction and the scoring auction with Oj(Q) = v(Q, t) follows directly. For the beauty contest, we argue that the equilibrium bid (p*, Q*) must belong to S. Because there is a positive probability that (p*, Q*) does not belong to argmax(p,Q)S{V(Q, t) -c(Q, 0)) for the actual type-unknown to the suppliers-of the buyer, UsP > UZsaw follows.
Theorem 3 understates the superiority of scoring auctions in two ways. First, scoring auctions are likely to dominate both procedures because they save on bidding costs for suppliers. In practice, the existence of bidding costs will limit the number of offers made in a menu auction. This favors the scoring auction. Likewise, the equivalence result for the beauty contest in the ascending format requires that suppliers submit a very high number of bids. Second, the comparison in Theorem 3 is with a scoring auction with scoring rule O(Q) = v(Q, t). As suggested by Che (1993) and Asker and Cantillon (2006) , the buyer will in general be better off announcing
O(Q) 0 v(Q, t).
We next consider the first-price menu auction. We first show the following general result.
Theorem 4. Any equilibrium of the first-price menu auction is inefficient.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Theorem 4 follows from the following observations. If the equilibrium in the menu auction involves pooling (suppliers make the same offer to different buyer types), inefficiency is immediate. If, instead, full separation occurs at equilibrium, inefficiency arises from the tension between the requirements of incentive compatibility and those of profit maximization. For the purpose of profit maximization alone, suppliers are tempted to target different profit levels according to the buyer's type. The buyer's incentive compatibility constraint limits the ability of suppliers to do this. We argue that the buyer's incentive compatibility constraint binds generically in any separating equilibrium of the first-price menu auction and show that qualities are distorted as a result. 14 The inefficiency of the first-price menu auction is not necessarily bad news for the buyer if it induces fiercer competition. To investigate this question further, we focus on the more restricted environment where private information is one-dimensional and the buyer can only have two '1 We find that there is no quality distortion at the top and at the bottom in the separating equilibrium of the first-price menu auction, a result that mirrors Rochet and Stole (2002) . Rochet and Stole develop the intuition for this finding. They also reconcile it with the discrete type case in which there is distortion at the bottom (see Theorem 5).
types.
5 , 16 The following theorem suggests that buyers with different types are likely to rank the two procedures differently. Biglaiser and Mezzetti, 2000) . 17 Suppose Q, 0 E R, t E {tL, tU} with tL < tfH. Suppose VQ(Q, tH) > vQ(Q, tL) and vQQ(Q, tH) < VoQ(Q, 0L) for all Q and that eQo > 0. Then, in the symmetric equilibrium of the menu auction, UF.ore(tL)P >_ UmIPtL) an
Theorem 5 (Adapted from Theorem 2 of
The proof of Theorem 5 closely follows that in Biglaiser and Mezzetti. A sketch is provided in the Appendix pointing out how to adapt their arguments.
At equilibrium, suppliers offer two contracts, one targeted at the low-type buyer, (QL, PL), and the other targeted at the high-type buyer, (QH, PH). The inequalities in Theorem 5 are strict whenever one of the incentive compatibility constraints (8), evaluated at the equilibrium offers of the scoring auction, binds. Biglaiser and Mezzetti (2000) argue that this will be the case when t L and t H are sufficiently close. Intuitively, when t L and t H are sufficiently distinct, the two contracts offered by each supplier are sufficiently different that the low-type buyer is not tempted by the high-type contract and vice versa. In that case, the bidding equilibrium in the truthful scoring auction describes the equilibrium contracts for each type in the menu auction.
18 When the two buyer types are sufficiently close, the incentive compatibility constraints bind. Following the intuition from the single-principal single-agent case, the price and quality of the low-type buyer is distorted downward to satisfy the incentive compatibility constraint of the high-type buyer. However, competition means that the participation constraint of the buyer is now endogenous from the point of view of an individual supplier: it depends on the bids of the other suppliers. This increases the costs of distorting the low-type contract relative to the single-principal single-agent benchmark. As a result, suppliers also use the price offered to the high-type buyer to help ensure his incentive compatibility constraint is satisfied. Thus, the price offered to the high-type buyer decreases relative to the scoring auction, and the high-type buyer is better off. "9
Biglaiser and Mezzetti point out that if the buyer knows his type prior to choosing a procedure, unraveling of the buyer's private information is likely: the low-type buyer chooses a scoring auction, leaving the high-type as the only type to choose the menu auction. Because he no longer has any private information, the menu and the scoring auction become equivalent again.
We now turn to the procedure where the buyer sets minimum quality standards and awards the contract on the basis of price only.
Theorem 6. Consider any standard auction format where the high bidder wins and its equivalent in the scoring auction. A buyer is always better off using a scoring auction with a scoring rule that corresponds to his true taste than imposing minimum quality standards/attribute levels and selecting the winner on the basis of price only.
Proof. Suppose the buyer sets minimum quality standards Q = Q E RS. Because costs are increasing, suppliers will set their quality levels at Q. We are now back to a standard procurement auction with symmetric bidders and costs c(Q, 0,) E R. Let x(:N) denote the nth highest-order statistics from N draws of random variable x. From the revenue equivalence theorem, the expected "5 When the equilibrium in the menu auction is known to be a separating equilibrium, then it is easy to show, using the techniques developed in the proof of Theorem 4, that some buyer types prefer the menu auction whereas others prefer the scoring auction.
" 6 Rochet and Stole (2002) note that pooling is a common feature of equilibrium in this class of models. How pooling affects the welfare of different buyers in the menu auction is unclear without a full characterization of the equilibrium.
"7 Biglaiser and Mezzetti consider a model in which multiple principals bid for the exclusive service of an agent. Each principal has private information about their valuation of the service, while the agent has private information about the disutility of providing the service. The first-price menu auction considered here is the procurement version of this model (with the agent being the buyer and the principals being the suppliers).
"15 Thus the outcome is efficient. This does not contradict Theorem 4 because Theorem 4 applies to the case where the buyer has a continuum of types.
"9 The quality offered to the high-type buyer remains at the first best.
utility of the buyer from this minimum quality standard auction is [c(Q, 0i) 
expected utility from the truthful scoring auction by Theorem 2. Q.E.D.
6. Concluding remarks M Our article provides a systematic analysis of equilibrium behavior in scoring auctions when private information is multidimensional. We have characterized the set of equilibria in scoring auctions and have argued that a single number, the supplier's pseudotype, is sufficient to describe the equilibrium outcome in these auctions, when the scoring rule is quasilinear and types are independently distributed. In doing so, we have drawn on the equivalence between the reduced form of a scoring auction and that of a standard single-object IPV auction. We have also derived a new expected utility equivalence theorem for scoring auctions. Both results extend existing theories of scoring auctions. In addition, we have shown that several other candidate procedures for buying differentiated products, including some, such as the menu auction and the beauty contest, that also combine competition with the flexibility of deciding on all the dimensions of the product, are dominated by scoring auctions. These results suggest that scoring auctions provide a useful mechanism (they are simple straightforward procedures) for buying differentiated products.
We conclude with a few remarks on potential venues for further research.
Suppliers' uncertainty about their costs at the time of bidding. In our model, it was immaterial whether bidders were committed to their offer or to the scores that their offer generated. Suppose now that the cost of attribute Q is given by c(Q, 0, r), where only 0 is known to the supplier at the time of bidding and r is known before the contract is executed. Define
Our equilibrium characterization results go through with this redefined pseudotype. The only difference is that the delivered quality level now generically differs from the offered quality level because the delivered quality will solve maxQfOb(Q) -c(Q, 0, r)} for the realization of r. This provides a rationale for making the scores, rather than the actual offers, binding. Thus, low-cost realizations generate higher levels of quality and higher prices for the supplier, whereas negative cost shocks generate lower qualities and lower prices." 0 This added flexibility is another advantage of the scoring auction relative to the other procedures that set the quality to be delivered at the contracting stage.
Noncontractible quality dimensions. An essential assumption for all our results is that quality is contractible. When some dimensions of the good are contractible and others not, contracting can generate perverse incentives, as Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) have shown. At the same time, it seems desirable to generalize the analysis of procurement mechanisms to such environments (see Che, forthcoming for a discussion of possible mechanisms).
Implications for empirical work. Even in the presence of symmetric suppliers, scoring auctions present interesting auction design questions (e.g., how can the buyer manipulate the scoring rule to his advantage?). However, scoring auctions present two difficulties from the point of view of identification: the identification of the functional form for the costs and the identification of the distribution of private information. One consequence of our sufficient statistics result is that the distribution of types will generally be nonidentified on the basis of auction data, even when the functional form for the costs is known. Indeed, the observed information (the scores) is one-dimensional, whereas the information to be inferred is multidimensional. This suggests two "25 The U.S. highway procurement authorities use such a reward/penalty scheme. possible solutions. When the (p, Q) offers rather than the scores are binding, the observed data are again multidimensional.
2 ' Another possibility is to look at auction data where changes in the scoring rule can be exploited. In any case, our article provides a theoretical basis from which investigation of identification is feasible.
Proof of Theorem 4. If the menu auction equilibrium involves pooling of offers, then inefficiency is immediate. Thus, we direct attention to equilibria where full separation occurs (a full menu is offered by each supplier).
Consider the optimization problem faced by a supplier of type 0. Let U(t, 6) denote the utility received by a buyer of type t from a supplier of type 0 in the equilibrium of the menu auction. The buyer's incentive compatibility constraint can be rewritten as d -U (t, 6)-= v,(Q(t, 6) , t)
(with second-order condition V,Q(t, 0) > 0). Let Pr (U, t) denote the equilibrium probability that an offer generating a level of utility U for a buyer of type t wins. Ignoring the second-order condition, the supplier's problem can be written
This is a standard optimal control problem, with U being the state variable and Q being the control variables. The Hamiltonian is given by
If a solution exists, it must satisfy the following first-order conditions (where we have dropped the arguments for simplicity):
To complete the proof, we now argue that L(t, 0) : 0 for a positive measure of t, that is, the buyer's incentive constraint binds. Toward a contradiction, suppose it does not. Then the equilibrium in the menu auction corresponds to the equilibrium in the scoring auction as t varies. Denote by (Q'(t, 0), P'(t, 0))OAr the menu generated from the equilibrium offers submitted by a supplier of type 0 in the scoring auction as t varies. From Corollary I and the known characterization of the equilibrium in the single-object IPV auction, the supplier's expost profit in the scoring auction is given by k(t, 6) - Ei[k(t, W)(I:N-) I k(t, W)(1:N-1) < k(t, 0)], where k(t, 6) is the pseudotype that corresponds to type 0 when the scoring rule is equal to v(Q, t) -p, and k(t, W)( 1 : N-1) denotes the first-order statistics of N -1 independent draws of pseudotypes. By the envelope theorem, kt(t, 6) = v,(Q(t, 0), t). It is independent of the distribution of 0. By contrast, the second term and its derivative with respect to t is a function of the distribution of 0. Thus the two terms do not cancel out and expost profits depend on t for a given 0 (except if supplier 0 wins with zero probability for all t). This implies-by Lemma 3-that the menu that corresponds to the equilibrium in the scoring auction is not incentive compatible, a contradiction.
When ;,(t, 0) -0, equation (A2) implies that qualities are distorted away from their efficient levels. Q.E.D.
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Sketch of proof of Theorem 5. Here we show how to adapt the arguments in Biglaiser and Mezzetti (2000) to fit our procurement framework. "25 For details, the reader is referred to Biglaiser and Mezzetti (2000) .
Assuming that ICL is slack (this is verified expost) and rewriting ICH as follows,
UH > v (QL, tH) -v (QL, tL) + UL
gives rise to the following Lagrangian for the bidders' optimization problem: The magazine publisher is the copyright holder of this article and it is reproduced with permission. Further reproduction of this article in violation of the copyright is prohibited. To contact the publisher: http://www.rand.org
